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1.  Introduction 
Many decision-making situations involve the choice among alternatives whose 
attributes cannot be readily altered.  This ranges from simple, everyday purchasing 
decisions (e.g., choice of which train to catch, choice of petrol brand when re-fueling a 
vehicle) to serious lifestyle decisions (e.g., a couple's choice of residential location, 
one's choice of dwelling type, and choice of workplace destination).  For such scenarios, 
traditional stated choice (T_SC) techniques are well-suited to capturing the behaviour of 
decision makers.  This holds for individual decision makers, such as those in the simple 
purchasing scenarios described above; this also holds for interdependent decision 
makers, such as the physical location decision described above. The former scenarios 
can be modelled using standard stated choice experiments, whilst the latter lends itself 
to the interactive agency choice experiment (IACE) method (e.g., Hensher and Chow 
1999, Brewer and Hensher 2000). 
 
Some decision-making situations involve the choice among alternatives decribed by a 
set of attribute levels that can be altered by one or more of the interactive agents, as a 
way of establishing cooperation and possibly (market) power in determining the choice 
outcome.  For example, when a prospective buyer and a salesperson interact in a car 
purchase scenario, the buyer may consider several models of vehicles (i.e., the base set 
of alternatives), and some of the attributes of those vehicles may be open for negotiation 
(e.g., colour, price, inclusion of accessories). In freight distribution, for example, the 
transporter and shipper may negotiate the level of delivery reliability (i.e., an acceptable 
window of arrival time), with each having very different starting positions. 
 
In such cases, the added flexibility to amend the attribute level mix corresponding to an 
alternative is tantamount to the presence of a superset of alternatives, the true 
bargaining set, generated by the base set of T_SC or market alternatives.  That is, with a 
set of j base alternatives under consideration, c attributes whose levels can be changed 
(i.e., negotiable attributes) by an agent within each alternative, and lc levels that each of 
the changeable attributes can take, the true set of alternatives that the agents could agree 
on is equal to j*
1
LC
c
lc
lc
=
∏ .  In the presence of quasi-continuous negotiable attributes, such 
as price or reliability measures, the bargaining set can be quite large.   
 
There may be many points within the bargaining set that yield more satisfactory 
outcomes for a group than those that are generated in the base T_SC set of alternatives. 
In real market settings, there may be low barriers to reaching these points. In interactive 
agency space, if the traditional SC method does not allow for feasible movements to 
these points, then the method is potentially limiting in making inferences about the 
behaviour of agents, and hence in making increasingly more realistic projections of 
future behaviour in related settings. 
 
These introductory remarks motivate the purpose of this paper as a think piece. In which 
situations are traditional SC experiments most useful, and what other method might be 
used as an alternative or extension of T_SC experiments when the latter are 
insufficient?  In the following section, we use freight contract bilateral negotiations 
between a transporter and a shipper as a context within which to illustrate the potential 
Extending stated choice analysis to recognise agent-specific attribute endogeneity in bilateral 
group negotiation and choice: a think piece  
Puckett, Hensher & Rose 
 
2 
shortcomings (or incompleteness) of T_SC experiments. We have chosen a two-agent 
setting in order to focus on the major issues that arise when introducing attribute 
endogeneity that is, in part at least, the result of negotiations between agents.  Hensher 
et al. (in press) show evidence in the context of freight distribution chains, that local 
interaction amongst two players is the most common negotiation setting. Any additional 
party (e.g., a recipient of the goods who does not interact with the freight transport 
provider) was treated as an exogenous force, setting some constraints on the interaction 
within the two-member group.   
 
In the following sections the proposed alternative SC method called Stated Endogenous 
Attribute Level (SEAL) is outlined, with a justification of its merits relative to 
traditional SC experiments.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the behaviour that 
can be captured through SEAL in contrast to that which can be captured through 
traditional SC experiments. 
 
2.  Do Stated Choice Experiments Have an Achilles' Heel? 
 
2.1  The Need for a Modified Method 
 
Stated choice methods are popular among the transport research community as a 
powerful tool for capturing preferences and making inferences about behaviour.  
However SC methods in their traditional form may not always be adequate and may 
need some extensions to reflect specific behavioural processes. This is especially the 
case when a choice outcome requires negotiation between interacting agents who can 
adjust attribute levels as part of the bargaining basis for arrving at a cooperative or non-
cooperative choice outcome. This is not a call to abandon SC methods. On the contrary, 
we strongly believe that the stated choice paradigm in its traditional form has great 
appeal for a wide range of applications, and will remain as the foundation around which 
variations can be introduced to account for attribute endogeneity in the context of agent 
interaction.  
 
2.2  SC Modelling in the Presence of Permissible Attribute-Level 
Endogeneity 
 
Consider a contract negotiation between two companies, a shipper and a freight 
transporter, as an application of stated choice methods (e.g., Bergantino and Bolis 
forthcoming, Holguin-Veras et al. 2004, Fowkes et al. 2004).  We draw on this example 
throughout. Should a modeller wish to analyse the behaviour of agents within such a 
setting, SC methods might be used in one of two ways: (1) a traditional SC experiment 
could be implemented to establish each agent's individual preferences for contract 
characteristics; or (2) an IACE could be implemented to identify each agent's individual 
preferences for contract characteristics and to examine the influence that the preferences 
of one agent type have on the preferences of the other agent type through a process of 
feedback and revision.  In both cases the modeller is able to estimate utility functions 
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for both agent types corresponding to contract profiles.  In the latter case the modeller is 
able to examine the impact that each agent type has on the utility of contract profiles for 
the other agent type (as shown in Rose and Hensher 2004) .   
 
Both of these types of choice experiments measure preferences by having each agent 
choose among a set of alternatives with fixed attribute levels.  In an analysis of 
preferences of contract characteristics, decision makers from shipping companies and 
freight transport companies could state their preferred alternative among a given set of 
fixed contract profiles.  The responses of each individual could be used in the estimation 
of utility functions for freight contract profiles for each agent type using standard 
discrete choice models. Is this a plausible representation of the negotiation setting for 
which preferences are being estimated?  T_SC methods have proven to be valuable for 
estimating preferences in settings in which respondents cannot influence the profiles 
under consideration, whether independent (via T_SC experiments) or interdependent 
(via IACEs).   
 
What is missing from such analysis, however, is information on how agents respond to 
each other's preferences when faced with uncertainty and a desire to reach a satisfactory 
group outcome. When agents interact in a bargaining setting, they typically adjust to 
one another, choosing among all tools within their disposal.  This toolkit includes each 
agent's ability to alter the attribute level mix on offer.  Put simply, if agent q prefers A 
and agent q' prefers B, the two agents could adjust the flexible properties of A such that 
its new form, A', yields a greater joint utility than either A or B. 
 
Thus if one wishes to model behaviour in a negotiation setting where attribute trading is 
permissable, traditional SC will not accomplish this; preferences may be measured, but 
the process by which joint preferences materialise is ignored, as is the revelation of  
afinal set of preferences arising from attribute revision.  Negotiating agents in a T_SC 
environment are only able to make trade-offs across bundles of fixed attribute levels, 
rather than making trade-offs at the attribute level across all attributes levels under the 
agents' control.   
 
In capturing this additional information, the starting position from which each agent’s 
revelation of preferences evolve can be either (i) the specification of the levels of the 
analyst-defined exogenous attributes (Louviere et al. 2000);, (ii) an agent’s endogenous 
attribute levels determined experimentally as in standard pivot-based SC experiments 
(Hensher 2006) or (iii) the offering of fixed attribute level mixes that are adjusted 
adaptively within the experiment (as in adaptive choice-based conjoint – see Johnson 
1991). Unlike traditional SC experiments, the extended experiment, detailed below, 
allows respondents to adjust endogenous attribute levels when the first preferences of 
group members do not coincide, in order to move to an agreed outcome or  a 
recognition of an impasse in agreement.  
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3.  Foundations of a Revised Method 
 
3.1  A Spatial Representation of Traditional SC Shortcomings 
 
To highlight the gap between the reality that the analyst may wish to model and the 
capability of traditional SC experiments to capture agents' behaviour and preferences,  
Figure 1 represents the utility two agents q and q’ would receive from three stated 
choice alternatives A, B and C in a given choice set.  The shaded area represents the 
feasible bargaining set for the two agents.  There are points within the shaded area in 
which the utility of at least one agent can be increased without decreasing the utility of 
the other, relative to each stated choice alternative.  Hence, not only would a traditional 
stated choice experiment fail to represent possible Pareto improvements, but the 
experiment would also fail to represent outcomes that would improve utility for both 
agents. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The decision space for interactive agent joint utility maximisation 
 
This is only one element of the possible gap between T_SC for these settings and the 
corresponding reality.  Specifically, the figure highlights the bounds on flexibility 
placed on negotiating agents in T_SC experiments should they behave in the 
experimental setting as they would in a real market.  This is a shortcoming, in that 
information available to identify a joint utility maximisation outcome is bounded and 
(potentially) limits the possibility of identification of the globally optimal utility 
maximisation outcome.  
 
3.2  Reflecting the “True” Process of Agent-Specific Attribute 
Identification 
 
When agents have the ability to change the attribute levels on offer (e.g., changing the 
colour of a vehicle, lowering the price, changing the length of a contract), the behaviour 
of agents is not restricted to a choice among a group of fixed alternatives.  For example, 
in the market, assume that the shipper regularly needs to move goods from its 
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distribution centres to its retail locations, and that the current contract between the retail 
firm and one of its partner freight firms is about to expire.  One of the two firms will 
contact the other to propose a contract re-negotiation.  Both firms bring their 
expectations and needs to the discussion when trying to negotiate a new contract. Each 
firm may take these expectations and needs and propose an initial contract offer.  Rather 
than haggling over which contract from the set of two offers to accept, and the 
alternative to decline to strike a deal, the two parties may use the two offers as starting 
points from which to make adjustments in their offers (Hensher et al. in press).  This is 
a process in which new alternatives are generated in response to the offers and needs of 
the other party.   
 
A method that embraces this process would have the potential to incorporate a 
mechanism that allows agents to approach a joint-utility-maximising ‘equilibrium’. The 
proposed method which we call Stated Endogenous Attribute Level (SEAL) analysis, 
begins as a traditional SC experiment in which the levels of the attributes are 
determined experimentally using proven experimental design techniques for 
determining exogenous attribute levels (e.g., d-optimal designs – see Rose and Bliemer 
2005, Kanninen 2002). The resulting initial choice sets faced by members of a sampled 
group are identical in form to a standard choice set given in a T_SC experiment.  
 
However, unlike T_SC experiments, the SEAL experiment allows respondents to adjust 
endogenous attribute levels when the first preferences of group members do not 
coincide.  Consider a simple choice set with three alternatives A, B and C, with two 
attributes classified by the analyst as exogenous (i.e., cannot be adjusted by 
respondents): travel time and damage rate. Along with these exogenous attributes, there 
are three endogenous attributes in each alternative: on-time arrival rate (which, given 
the set of exogenous constraints, could feasibly be satisfied by the transporter by taking 
the required measures), the freight rate charged, and customer satisfaction rating. The 
attribute levels could be functions of revealed preference information specified by 
respondents, along with their positions on the minimum and maximum levels of the 
attribute they believe could feasibly be offered (e.g., travel time cannot be lower than 30 
minutes); this latter information could then be utilised to set the upper and lower bounds 
of the endogenous attributes. 
 
Once presented with a choice set, if both respondents prefer the same alternative as 
given, choice equilibrium is trivial to establish. If they do not both prefer the same 
alternative as given, however, the experiment moves into its extended phase. One or 
both respondents are given the opportunity to take the alternative they would most like 
to use to build a counter-offer, and then each adjusts the levels of the endogenous 
attributes and continues to do so with feedback and revison until one arrives at attribute 
levels that are most conducive to establishing a satisfactory consensus outcome. For 
example, if the respondent representing a freight transport provider prefers a different 
alternative to the respondent representing a shipper, or if one or both respondents would 
prefer a variant of the same alternative, one respondent would be prompted to build a 
preferred counter-offer out of the set of alternatives. The respondent would then be free 
to select any alternative and adjust the levels of one or more of the endogenous 
attributes within their specified feasible ranges (e.g., select alternative A and raise the 
freight rate by $100 and raise the on-time arrival rate by 5 percent). If the other 
respondent is willing to accept the counter-offer as a group choice outcome, equilibrium 
has been reached and the choice experiment with its revised choice set has concluded. If 
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the other respondent is not willing to accept the counter-offer, he is then given the 
opportunity to build a counter-offer in the same manner, selecting his most-desired 
alternative to use as a base and adjusting its endogenous attributes. The process repeats 
until either a consensus can be established, or impasse is reached (i.e., either a 
maximum number of iterations has passed, or one or both of the respondents states that 
it would be impossible to strike a compromise). Importantly the initial design is revised 
and assessed iteratively subject to a stop rule such as a fixed number of  iterations to 
estbalish agreement or not. The entire process of review and revison and final choice 
outcome can be executed through internet-based or computer-aided personal interview 
data collection techniques. The final group equilibrium responses and attribute levels 
become the data input relevant to the estimation of the discrete choice models (see 
below).  
 
3.3  Context Setting 
 
As with all SC experiments, to make the SEAL experiment setting meaningful, one 
must set the context of the experiment.  For the example of a freight contract between a 
transport provider and its client, one might ask the transporter  for information about a 
recent or typical relevant distribution activity.  This might include delivery time 
constraints, sizes and value of cargo, lead times, reliability requirements, travel times, 
costs, and distances travelled.  Capturing this contextual information is essential, in 
order to have respondents negotiating in the same hypothetical space (i.e., in terms of 
the exact same distribution activity).  Once the profile of the distribution activity (PDA) 
is established, the shipper and the freight agent are able to carry out the experiment 
acting in reference to the PDA. 
 
Whilst specific context-setting information is provided by the respondents, the analyst's 
choice of general setting is also important.  One line of experimental settings that lend 
themselves to SEAL analysis are responses to unexpected changes in the state of the 
world.  For example, a government policy that directly and significantly impacts the 
operations of one or more agents under contract would necessitate contract re-
negotiations.  Hence, it could be realistic to hypothesise that a particular change in the 
state of the world has occurred, such as the introduction of variable use congestion 
charges, and that the respondents have agreed to consider re-structuring their contract 
(in terms of who will bear the cost).   
 
Recruiting and matching pairs of agents is straighforward, although potentially time 
consuming. We have found in the freight distribution context (see Hensher et al. in 
press) that the transporter is the best starting respondent followed by a client of a freight 
firm. If, as can occur, a client is not provided to the analyst, we have found that 
matching a client (i.e, shipper) to a transporter based on a pre-defined classification rule 
(such as the delivery of the same product category) works well.  The survey given to the 
other party involves the identical series of choice sets faced by the corresponding 
freight transporter.   
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3.4  Specification of Attribute Relationships 
 
There are two key issues to handle when allowing for attribute levels to be endogenous 
within an experiment: (1) there may exist functional relationships between two or more 
attributes, such that varying the level of one necessitates a change in the level of another 
(e.g., travelling during relatively more congested periods would make average travel 
times greater than when travelling during relatively less congested periods, ceteris 
paribus); and (2) some attributes that matter to one agent may not matter to the other, 
yet there may be a functional relationship between some of them (e.g., lead time matters 
to the shipper but not to the transporter, travel time matters to the transporter but not to 
the shipper, and higher travel times cause higher lead times, ceteris paribus).   
 
The importance of the first issue is that, although agents may have the power to alter 
some attribute levels, their flexibility may not be absolute - changing one attribute level 
may constrain another attribute level within a particular range.  In designing an 
experiment, the analyst must identify, a priori, which attributes have an impact on 
others, and then must specify the feasible set of attribute level combinations, based on 
the background information uncovered by the analyst through research, focus groups, 
interviews and the like.  SEAL respondents are informed that not all attribute level 
combinations are possible, and that in order to offer a particular attribute level, it may 
be necessary to restrict other attribute levels offered to within a particular set of ranges.  
Outside of these restrictions, respondents are informed that they are free to offer any 
attribute level combination that is allowed within the experiment. 
 
The importance of the second issue above is that one must tie the elements of the 
experiment together meaningfully, such that an offer made by one agent can be 
converted into the terms desired by the other.  This is also important for attributes 
between which there is no functional relationship.  If such an attribute is important to an 
agent q yet has no relevance to the agent q', the attribute becomes important to q' to the 
extent that he or she must offer a level of the attribute that satisfies q. Therefore, such 
attributes must form part of the attribute consideration set for q', regardless of the level 
of importance of the attribute to q'.  A SEAL experiment should be designed such that, 
in the presence of such cases, these attributes are automatically placed in an agent's 
consideration set; respondents are informed that the attributes appear in their 
consideration sets due to the importance of the attribute to the other agent.  In the freight 
contract example, if travel time savings and the impact of a policy change on 
distribution activity are likely to be of significant importance to the freight firm; these 
may also matter to the shipper, but only in their manifestation into attributes that 
directly matter to the shipper (e.g., lead time, arrival time, cost). 
 
3.5 The SEAL data strategy 
 
To identify the preferences of SEAL respondents, the analyst has multiple frames of 
reference from which to choose. Within each choice set the analyst observes 
respondents: (a) selecting a preferred alternative amongst the original alternatives 
offered (see Figure 2 as an example); (b) constructing a counter-offer (i.e a restructured 
attribute package) that is preferred to the (counter) offer most recently given by the 
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other member of the group; and (c), assuming impasse is not reached, agreeing to a 
group choice outcome. The information in (a) is identical to that observed in traditional 
SC experiments, and hence can be modelled in the same manner as in a T_SC analysis. 
The empirical extension offered within SEAL analysis of preference revelation lies in 
(b), which is an array of two-alternative choice sub-sets relating to each choice set (i.e., 
the counter-offer represents a chosen alternative, whilst the (counter) offer most recently 
given represents the unchosen alternative). This is illustrated in Figure 3. The 
observation in (c) is technically an extension of (b), being the final choice observation 
made for the choice set.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An example of a traditional (stage 1) SC screen 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An example of an extended (stage 2) SC screen 
 
Extending stated choice analysis to recognise agent-specific attribute endogeneity in 
bilateral group negotiation and choice: a think piece  
Puckett, Hensher & Rose 
 
9 
This procedure may on first consideration be thought to be similar to adaptive conjoint 
analysis (ACA), a well-supported technique that has its sceptics and econometric 
shortcomings (Green et al. 1991, Johnson 1991). However, although the array of 
preferred counter-offers and less-preferred (counter) offers appears similar to ACA, 
there are significant differences. Adaptive conjoint analysis centres on the use of 
experimentally-controlled variations in one attribute level at a time, utilising standard 
discrete choice techniques to model the marginal rates of substitution implied in the 
choice of one alternative over the other. Such a procedure is purported to run the risk of 
biased parameter estimates (Toubia et al. 2003, Bradley and Daly 2000). Conversely, 
SEAL analysis of independent preferences centres on the use of respondent-controlled 
variations in attributes that respondents could feasibly vary in the real market. 
Furthermore, SEAL analysis offers respondents the opportunity to both: (a) adjust 
multiple attributes within a given alternative; and (b) vary the exogenous attribute levels 
within each pair of (counter) offer alternatives by selecting a different base alternative 
off of which to construct the counter-offer relative to the (counter) offer most recently 
given. Hence, SEAL analysis of independent choices is similar to ACA only to the 
extent that a pair of alternatives is traded off of each other, both of which are a function 
of the original alternatives offered.  
 
Ultimately, the analyst can hypothesise a range of logical relationships amongst 
counter-offers; these relationships can be exploited to reveal additional information 
about the behaviour of respondents.  Two examples are of primary interest.  Firstly, as 
discussed above, each counter-offer by an agent q should yield a greater utility to q than 
the most recent offer by q', otherwise q would have accepted the offer rather than 
proposing a counter-offer.  If this holds, which appears reasonable, then adjacent offer 
pairs such as those above can be examined in two dimensions: (1) the direct utility 
difference between all adjacent offer pairs; and (2) the evolution of these offer pairs as 
the experiment progresses.   
 
Secondly, each offer made by an agent q should yield a lower utility to q than all offers 
made by q preceding the offer.  That is, agents are likely to request a more favourable 
outcome initially and then concede across rounds of negotiation, rather than stepping up 
demands as the negotiation proceeds.  This is a testable assumption which is less 
logically certain than the first.  Marginal utility estimates from other portions of the 
analysis could be used to confirm the hypothesis; once confirmed, the corresponding 
observations could be analysed to examine the levels and types of concession made by 
respondents as the experiment progresses 
 
4. The Main Modelling Structure for SEAL 
 
The observed behaviour within a SEAL experiment can be investigated within any form 
of discrete choice model that is appropriate for a T_SC experiment. What separates 
SEAL from other T_SC analysis econometrically is the specification of the final set of 
alternatives and the choice made. This final set is referred to as the group ‘equilibrium’ 
and is the primary data of interest, although some analysts may be interested in the 
empirical path that leads to this circumstance. We do not have the relevant data at this 
stage to formally estimate the model but would encourage transportation research in this 
area. 
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The econometric modelling structure for any of these options is identical to that utilised 
within traditional SC experiments. The set of alternatives for each agent consists of the 
final (counter-)offer made by the respondent (which is also specified as the chosen 
alternative) and the most recent (counter-)offer given to the respondent. Utility 
estimates are calibrated against the observed choice behaviour: 
 
U(1) = β1*x1 + β2*x2 + … + βK*xK + εA 
 
U(2) = β1*x1 + β2*x2 + … + βK*xK + εB (1) 
 ….. 
U(J) = β1*x1 + β2*x2 + … + βK*xK + εJ 
 
where β represents the marginal utility of each of K attributes x in each of J alternatives. 
Any exogenous attributes may be constant across a given pair of alternatives, should the 
(counter-) offer made by the respondent be based upon the same initial alternative as the 
most recent (counter) offer. This is not problematic as long as there is sufficient 
variation across such alternative pairs within the sample.  
 
The model structure involves the stacking of utility expressions for each agent (1,…,N 
for agent 1 and N+1,…., J for agent 2). A mixed logit form provides the opportunity 
through random parameters and error components to account for correlated structures 
between alternatives and agents (Greene and Hensher 2006). 
 
The approach based on equation system (1) focusses on the outcomes for each agent. 
This is extremely important information; however its primary role should be in the 
identification of the marginal utilities of each attribute for each agent in the 
circumstance where the outcome can be either one of agreement or non-agreement. 
Agreement exists where the same alternative is accepted by both parties as the preferred 
equilibrium outcome. However there will also exist non-agreement outcomes that define 
a situation where delivering an activity to market does not occur.   Hensher et al. (in 
press) have argued that the focus of group decision making modelling should be on both 
studying (i) the full set of group preferences (for example, if there are 3 alternatives per 
person, then there are 9  group combinations, 3 of which would be associated with 
agreement outcomes i.e., 11, 22, and 33); and (ii) the agreement outcomes only. The 
former specification is particulary useful in investigating potential barriers to agreement 
(as shown in Brewer and Hensher 2000). 
 
Should the group fail to strike a deal, an analysis of non-agreement can be very 
informative. It can be explained as a function of the characteristics of the offers made 
and of any additional information, such as historical evidence of cooperation, 
competitive effects, market power and relative performance.  For example, let Y equal a 
(0, 1) or (-1, 0, 1) indicator of non-agreement.  In both cases, one denotes termination of 
negotiation by at least one agent (this could be expanded into multiple indicators, one 
for termination by each agent type); in the latter case -1 denotes that the agents believed 
that an agreement was feasible, but that time constraints kept that agreement from being 
reached. In this case, this would be equivalent to a T_SC choice set with the number of 
alternatives equal to the number of offers made (and, if desired, the number of initial 
alternatives) plus one, in which the chosen alternative j is the decision to terminate the 
negotiation; that is, Y(j) = 1.  The consequences of terminating the negotiation are 
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specified within the experiment, and the characteristics of this state are reflected in the 
attributes of the utility expression for j. 
 
The most interesting phase of modelling involves carrying forward marginal utility 
estimates from models of agent-specific preferences (as per equation 1) associated with 
final offers into an analysis of the group agreement outcomes (i.e., the three pairs in the 
example above U(11), U(22), U(33)). In a manner consistent with models by Aribarg et 
al. (2002), Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) and Hensher and Puckett (2006), the analyst 
has the opportunity to compare the estimated utility of a given pair of agreement offers 
from the set of all agreement outcomes to reveal the power relationships between the 
players. A contrast with the initial preferences based on a model of each individuals first 
preference, in the absence of negotiation, would also be informative of the role that each 
player exerts in achieving final agreement. 
 
Agent-specific utility estimates can be used within a model to identify group 
preferences along the lines promoted by a number of authors (e.g., Dosman and 
Adamowicz 2006, Hensher and Knowles 2006, Hensher et al. in press). For a given 
choice set, the projected chosen alternative of the group is compared to the unchosen 
alternatives in order to estimate a vector of attribute-specific power measures, τqk. 
 
To accomplish this, estimates of agent-specific group equilibrium preference parameters 
are carried forward as constant exogenous terms into the a power model, and multiplied 
by the corresponding attribute levels for each of the K attributes in each alternative j in 
choice set p faced by all respondents q in group g.  For each simulated group 
interaction, gp, the alternative designated as the choice is the group choice projected 
using a choice coordination algorithm. The previously-estimated agent-specific 
marginal utilities derived by each q in each j, the vector of attribute levels in each 
alternative xjk and any covariates of interest are the exogenous variables used to 
calculate the vector τqk., which, along with any alternative-specific constants are the only 
free parameters in the model (equation 2). Whilst the most general two-agent case is 
offered here, this calculation can be augmented through the inclusion of additional 
interacting agents: 
 
11 11 11U  =  + ( * )  * + ((  ) * )  *  + α ε' 'qk qk 1k qk q'k 1kx 1- xτ β τ β  
... 
1J 1J 1JU  =  + ( * )  * + ((  ) * )  *  + α ε' 'qk qk 1k qk q'k Jkx 1- xτ β τ β        (2) 
... 
JJ JJ JJU  =  + ( * )  * + ((  ) * )  *  + α ε' 'qk qk Jk qk q'k Jkx 1- xτ β τ β , 
 
where Ujm is the estimated utility the group g derives from the joint choice of alternative 
j by agent q and alternative m by agent q' in simulated group interaction gp, α represents 
an alternative-specific utility component for the joint choice alternative, τqk*βqk 
represents a vector of the product of relative influence measures for agent type q and the 
independent marginal utility derived by q for attribute k in j, xjk represents the vector of 
levels of each k present in j, ((1-τqk)*βq'k)' represents a vector of the product of relative 
influence measures for the q’th agent (1-τqk) and the independent marginal utility derived 
by q' for k in m, xmk represents the vector of levels of each k present in m, and εjm 
represents the unobserved effects for the joint choice alternative. 
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The econometric analysis focuses on a power model that reflects the relative power 
structure present between agent types (herein a transport or a shipper). Analysing 
influence structures, the data allow us to infer estimates of relative power between 
agents. The power measures for agents q (τqk) and q' (1-(τqk) sum to unity for each 
attribute k, making comparisons of influence across agent types straightforward. If the 
two power measures are equal for a given attribute k (i.e., τqk = (1 - τqk)  = 0.5), then 
group choice equilibrium is not governed by a dominant agent with respect to attribute 
k. In other words, regardless of the power structure governing other attributes, agent 
types q and q' tend to reach perceptively fair compromises when bridging the gap in 
their preferences for k.  If the power measures are significantly different across agent 
types (e.g., τqk >> (1 - τqk)), then τqk gives a direct measure of the dominance of one agent 
type over the other with respect to attribute k; as τqk increases, so does the relative power 
held by agent type q over q' for k. 
 
For example, in a freight distriibution chain, the power measures may reveal that one 
agent type tends to get its way with regard to monetary concerns, whereas the other 
agent type tends to get its way with regard to concerns for levels of service. These 
relationships can be examined further within subsets of agent groups (by decomposition 
of the random parameter specification of τqk in a mixed logit model), in order to reveal 
deviations from the inferred behaviour at the sample level associated with exogenous 
influneces that may be present for a particular type of relationship. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remark 
 
This paper is a think piece to generate debate on alternative ways in which choice 
experiments can be specified in order to capture the realities of markets in which many 
decisions involve interaction and negotiation between two or more agents. While stated 
choice experiments will remain an appealing paradigm, there is a risk that they are seen 
as the only way forward. Their popularity must be conditioned by their suitability.  
 
This paper promotes an ongoing dialogue on alternative ways in which we might 
represent the way in which agents make decisions in real markets. SEAL data can be 
analysed using the same set of econometric methods currently used in traditional stated 
choice studies, such as mixed logit. The crucial difference however is the behavioural 
richness of the extended SC data that has resulted from a process of review and 
feedback amongst agents to reveal a more likely structure for the attribute package(s) 
that would deliver joint utility maximising group outcomes, in contrast to the 
requirement in traditional stated choice to have to undertake an increased amount of 
extrapolation and inference within the bounded attribute space under study (which may 
not cover the ultimate decision package leading to agreement) in order to seek out the 
utility maximising group outcome. 
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